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"Do Your Remember Laura?" or, The Limits 
of Autobiography Michael G. Cooke 
TO SPEAK ABOUT the 'Umits' of anything is perhaps to conjure up im 
ages of border guards and customs and arbitrary papers before there can be 
any hope of getting into the reality rather than the limits of the subject. That 
sort of possessive, subhmely self-involved approach may have a certain 
charm, if one decides it is ineluctable and treats it as a form of the art of 
intricate dogmatism; visitors to India testify to the gauntlet charm of its 
border bureaucracy. But that is not in store here. Rather than prescribing or 
administering the immigration laws of autobiography, I'd Uke to reflect on 
some of the phenomena of presence that lead us to say, 'this is (or this is not) 
an autobiography,'just as we might, after some familiarity with India, say 
on a particular occasion: 'this is (or this is not) India.' In other words, I take 
up the unassuming task of discussing recognizable, pragmatic Umits of au 
tobiography, and not absolute or essential ones. This entails treating 'Umits' 
as a bi-directional concept, in terms of what comes into autobiography 
from other states of organizing and articulating experience, as well as what 
may, by virtue of one modulation or another, break out of the orbit of the 
form. 
Some of the best things said on the matter of autobiography don't par 
ticularly have this genre in mind. A writer records a gesture some person 
makes, or offers a reflection on the human state, and viola, Uke releasing a 
handkerchief and retrieving a dove, he seems to have thrown off something 
with real vitality and substance for autobiography. 
Take, for example, the case of Lu Hsun, in a smaU book of essays caUed 
Dawn Blossoms Plucked at Dusk. Lu Hsun, coming into prominence between 
the two World Wars, was a Chinese academic and social critic (he called 
Freud an "eccentric Austrian scholar"); he is getting more and more recog 
nition for the importance of his thought in early repub?can China. This is 
no place to touch on the trouble he experienced in scholastic circles on ac 
count of his progressivist views, or on the qua?ty of his writing?suffice it 
to say that he reminds one of Charles Lamb, with a mordant turn of mind. 
Two of his remarks in Dawn Blossoms ring, for me, with rich resonances 
across the field of autobiography. Lu Hsun writes: 
When a man reaches the stage when aU that remains to him 
is memories, his Ufe should probably count as futile 
enough. 
. . . 
Here is a sudden heavy charge against any autobiographer, who in that 
capacity must seem preoccupied with memory. Even if we think ofmem 
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ory as an act, and not just a faculty, it is an act without efficacy, a contrary 
act of resting with completed acts and conditions. It tacitly treats life as 
over. But Piaget in analyzing memory indicates that it is not only "figura 
tive" in this way. It is also often "operative" consisting of action "schemes" 
or 
representative "schemes" that promote competence and comprehension 
in situations yet to arise in actuality (On the Development of Memory and 
Identity, Clark U. Press, Barre Publishers, 1968). Here the act of memory 
pivots off itself into some enterprise, aspiration, or hope for the future. 
This, however, would seem to make memory not so much an independent 
subject as a handy object, a sewing basket out of which one decides how to 
thread a way into the future. The situation pivots away from autobiography 
to prophecy. One immediately recognizes a difference between the two, 
and wiU countenance their borrowing from but not becoming one another. 
On account of Lu Hsun, then, one comes to focus on a certain limit for 
autobiography?it must not verge over into programmatics and prophecy. 
There is yet another angle from which Lu Hsun's remark repays scrutiny. 
He seems unkind to the man of memories: "His life should probably count 
as futile enough/' Does Lu Hsun mean "his life" in that condition, or al 
together? Is the futility localized or does it spread backward to bUght more 
fruitful days? This may prove an important debate for eschatology, but for 
autobiography it is immaterial. In either case, the act of memory ends up 
thin, and slack, and somehow, in character if not in detail, monotonous. If 
prophecy marks off where autobiography cannot go, memory warns of 
where it may not stay?autobiography cannot be Umited to memory. 
Lu Hsun again gives a glimpse of what else is required. He recalls the 
treats of his childhood and comments: 
Tasting [the vegetables and fruits I ate as a child in my old home] . . . 
after a protracted absence, I found them nothing special. It was only in 
retrospect that they retained their old flavour. They may keep on de 
ceiving me my whole Ufe long, making my thoughts turn constantly to 
the past. 
Obviously the memory in play in this instance is not "all that remains" to 
the character. He has a 
multiple perspective, a present that comments on the 
past and a past that impinges on the present, in a sort of tacit psychomachia. 
He also can judge the merits of both states, and speculate on the future of 
their relationship in a way that falls, however, in the realm of confession 
rather than prophecy. He has the same taste for the memory of "vegetables 
and fruits" that he used to have for the actual provisions; he is "deceived" 
by the memory, but lucidly, voluntarily. The memory takes on an im 
mediate presence, without presentness. It can whet but never again satisfy 
an appetite. His judgment upon and his desire for what has been, and its 
force upon him in spite of his judgment: all enter into the standing of mem 
ory. Lu Hsun does not offer any overt statement about "his life," but con 
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jures it up, its stages and states in an unsettled and stiU intelUgible, even clear 
relation to one another. The thread of memory falls within the limits of au 
tobiography when it is woven thus inextricably into a unitary Une because 
the memory, though indispensable, avoids arrogance and "remains," along 
with analytical and comparative and evaluative perspective, along with sus 
ceptibi?ty and purpose, to express the personaUty that is paramount for the 
form. 
What about this personaUty, though? Is it a product of experience in time, 
or of words? Obviously it becomes available through words, but arises out 
of many other structures and features, and expresses itself as well outside of 
words. The very fact that memory enters into the case points to experience 
and time as crucial to the personality in autobiography. But does it not fol 
low at once that the self is prevented from being authoritative, or authorial, 
in regard to itself? If it tries to settle on the grounds of what it has in time, 
memory is all that remains, but if it treats the situation as stiU intrinsicaUy 
open, it must wait indefinitely to speak. Only the dead have an unassailable 
position, since it seems that autobiography ought to be the posthumous 
form. But the Uving have an unassailable choice, and that is the choice of 
not dying, or rather of not having died. For autobiography from Gibbon and 
Rousseau to Eiseley and Yeats appears to be a confrontation not merely of 
mortality but of a radical feeling of something "next to death." In this re 
spect the form is not obeying but testing a limit, going to a Umit so that the 
bios will not be marred by incompleteness in the graphein and will truly 
emerge as auto. 
It has been said that everybody has a life, while not everybody can have 
an 
autobiography. In relation to the question of death it appears though that 
every autobiography may come from a radical life-impulse. Here again use 
ful light comes from a source outside of the genre. In a recent story called 
"Who Is Who, and When Will We Be Real?" Jack Matthews presents a 
character who contrives to write her autobiography, or at least to produce 
an original and self-determined version of her life, after her death. Modern 
technology helps; Beanie's "autobiographical" statement is, Uke Krapp's, 
on tape. But it is conceived of as posthumous, and embodies what must be 
the ultimate autobiographical impulse, to offset and defeat all other versions 
of one's being or one's meaning. This is the impulse that Hamlet retains at 
the point of death, when he no longer is moved by jealousy or justice, and 
he does his best to fulfill it by calling on Horatio to "tell my tale aright." 
What Horatio would have said then would have been autobiography by 
alter ego. 
In Matthews' story, Beanie resorts to the tape recorder as a response to 
"her imminent death," as a way of saying from a comprehensive and de 
tached vantage point what the dynamic and emergent processes, really the 
demands of life have not allowed her to say. She means it to be "the comple 
tion of life," having "always had this almost neurotic passion to finish 
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things, and thereby leave nothing undone." No life in the ordinary ongoing 
sense remains to her on her deathbed. The tapes, to be heard after she has 
passed away, enable her consciously to escape the autobiographer's disability 
in time. 
Another escape from disability, another tacit motive for autobiography 
also emerges on a tape Beanie secretly makes for her alter ego, the cleaning 
woman, Whittaca Bass, but not without awareness that Whittaca, who is 
mentally unstable, might well divulge it. This tape amounts to Beanie's 
way of telling her own tale aright, and breaking the authority of the world, 
in the form of husband or friends or social customs and political values, 
over her. Sociologists like Peter Berger argue for the social construction of 
reality; autobiography implies the personal construction of reality. And 
Beanie is pitting her autobiographical against her social definition, so as to 
be something in and by herself, and not just a product of external forces. 
Those forces have clearly taken her over, dictating certain responses she 
may once have spontaneously made, dictating them by the very act of ap 
preciating them. These responses, repeated to captivate others, eventually 
capture her, and so become, as her husband blithely remarks, "the 'real 
Beanie'?the Beanie everyone knew and sort of marveled at." 
The clearest and simplest sign that Beanie is declaring the self that 
amounts to what she would call 'real' comes from the matter of her name. 
'Beanie' has been imposed on her, as a result of a single incident of sartorial 
eccentricity?again, the gesture canonized by others and confining to the 
self. She comes out for, and as Clarissa, the name which, though actually 
given her at birth, is free of the distortions and encumbrances of social 
norms. She is in a sense born again after her death, with the singular advan 
tage of being in a position to choose her name for herself (it is, incidentally, 
a critical distinction between fiction and autobiography that in fiction a 
first-person protagonist may be with good effect anonymous, but in au 
tobiography the central figure cannot do without a name). 
The instrinsic importance of naming to being reveals itself at once in the 
Adamic myth. The five prior days of creation are really a divine prolepsis, 
where things that have been brought into existence remain to be called into 
that existence; they exist to be named, in order to exist as themselves. Cer 
tain corollaries also attach to the radical function of naming. One's name 
influences and can subsume one's sense of worth and other people's opin 
ion: "who steals my purse steals trash . . . But he that filches from me my 
good name. ..." Or we can look at the matter negatively and see that 
namelessness means a form of annihilation. The crafty Ulysses, disguising 
himself as Nemo, is less an exception than an illustration of the rule. His 
assumption of namelessness gets him clear physically, but it also cancels 
him out. He survives as Nemo, no one. The suspension of himself before 
Polyphemus has a reveahng analog in his re-entry as a negUgible old man 
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into his home. He has to come forth, declare himself, to be himself with any 
effect. 
It is well to observe the congruence that exists between the autobiog 
raphical need to create his own name, to create himself in his image, and the 
need to speak consummately in spite of the silencing effect of death's con 
summatum est. Both namelessness and death obviate the possibiUty of au 
tobiography. And autobiographers continually occupy themselves with 
two correlative principles: the freedom and power of naming and a certain 
freedom from and power over death. This is perhaps the principle that if the 
autobiography can begin before Ufe (as with parents), it may symmetrically 
continue after death. The documentation comes readily to mind. Rousseau 
is trying to get us to accept a peculiar, ingratiatingly scandalous Jean 
Jacques. Newman in the Apologia is writing about the justice and honor of 
naming himself Father, and Malcolm X in the Autobiography is emerging, 
through a veritable maze of imposed sobriquets (from the ominous "Little" 
to the scandalous 
"Satan"), into the chosen El-Hajj MaUk el-Shabazz. By 
the same token, Gibbon and Goethe, Coleridge and Newman, Yeats and 
Eiseley, all have extreme experiences of illness and vulnerability akin to 
death. We may recall also CelUni's scorpion that miraculously fails to bite, 
and Bunyan's bell that is miraculously expected to fall. The death 
threatened or felt is not only physical but also spiritual. In Newman's case, 
as Michael Ryan has pointed out, the very title of the Apologia impUes a 
warding off of the death that is expUcit in Newman's fear of being taken for 
a "scarecrow" ("The Question of Autobiography in Cardinal Newman's 
Apologia Pro Vita Sua," The Georgia Review, 31(1977), p. 698). Whether 
they dwell on the presence of death with gloomy and loving obsession, Uke 
Eiseley, or touch it with a brief and poignant dignity, Uke Goethe, it is clear 
that they regard themselves as survivors of death. They speak as it were 
apocalypticaUy, through the veil of felt if not actual passage from Ufe. They 
speak, as the dead cannot, but they speak with a retrospective finaUty that 
the vita media cannot know. This is what makes autobiography more than a 
true record or brute sum of a life; it comes as a personal summa, and when 
this summa is avoided, as in Vico and Freud, a certain coldness and astig 
matism of vision result; and correspondingly where this summa eludes the 
writer, as it does Gibbon and Bertrand Russell, a certain wateriness and in 
coherence appear. 
To speak from a position of summing up, with a sense of the end, may 
seem to imply something Nestorian, or at least Hamletic. But it is crucial to 
recognize that little of the "ghost come back from the dead" appears in au 
tobiography. The nature of the genre works against that. Though writing 
to others, the autobiographer writes of, by, and for himself. Henry Adams 
catches the singular spirit involved when he says that "even dead men allow 
themselves a few narrow prejudices." But perhaps the proper emphasis 
would fall not on the epithet, "prejudices" but on the act, "allow," on the 
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freedom of the case. Albert Camus has recognized the freedom conferred by 
the immediate assurance of death, citing "that unbeUevable disinterested 
ness with regard to everything except for the pure flame of life," and 
declaring that "death and the absurd are . . . the principles of the only 
reasonable freedom: that which a human heart can experience and Uve" 
("An Absurd Reasoning," in The Myth of Sisyphus). Among the personal 
literary forms, autobiography is the most exphcit, constant, and intense in 
its emphasis on this freedom. What might be called the will of the 
autobiographer is neatly captured by J.M.W. Turner in his description of 
being lashed to a ship's mast in a storm for the sake of pursuing his art: 
I did not paint to be understood, but I wished to show what such a 
scene was Uke. . . I was lashed for four hours and I did not expect to 
escape, but I felt bound to record it if I did. But no one had any 
business to like the picture. 
Two phrases warrant special attention here. First, Turner "felt bound to 
record it if" he escaped death, and though he chooses the risk of death 
whereas that risk befalls Newman, he seems motivated as much to record 
the fact of his coming through as the terms of his experience. This is what 
gives special resonance to his other declaration, that "no one had any busi 
ness to like the picture." He is not working to be "Uked" or even, as he has 
earlier pointed out, "to be understood." He is showing "what such a scene 
was like," or in the autobiographical analog, what such a Ufe was like. The 
work is for the record, and the record is for being. As Hegel says in The 
Phenomenology of Mind: 
it is solely by risking Ufe that freedom is obtained; only thus is it tried 
and proved that the essential nature of self-consciousness is not bare 
existence, is not the merely immediate form in which it at first makes 
its appearance . . . .The individual, who has not staked his Ufe, may, no 
doubt, be recognized as a Person; but he has not attained the truth of 
his 
recognition as an independent self-consciousness 
.... 
This trial by death, however, cancels both the truth which was to 
result from it, and therewith the certainty of self altogether. 
(Baillie trans., Harper Torchbooks, p. 23) 
In effect, the autobiographer, in going over his Ufe, is overgoing death and 
giving not only the reader but himself a vital confirmation of being. 
This postulate fails to accord with some powerful analyses of autobiog 
raphy in recent years. Jerome Mazzaro, for example, says that "Regardless 
of whether [the autobiographer] chooses to view his life as celebratory 
(sharing experience with others), confessional (unburdening guilt), 
apologetic (defending an action or course), or explanatory (revealing hidden 
motives or meaning), he turns his past into an illustration of something" ("The 
Fact of Beatrice," in The Literature of Fact, ed. Angus Fletcher, New York: 
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Columbia U. Press, 1976, pp. 94-95). But the confessional and apologetic 
autobiographies by which one would most wish to test this thesis will not 
bear it out. Rousseau and DeQuincey proclaim more than they excuse 
themselves, and defy our standards and conception of guilt more than they 
submit and sue for atonement. Similarly Newman is not just defending his 
course of life, but pressing for acknowledgement of himself within his for 
mal position?he wishes "to be known as a living man" and not as a 
"scarecrow. . .dressed" in his clothes (an obvious reference to his black cler 
ical garb). The autobiography is provoked by his role as Roman cleric, but 
is produced for his being as individual man. 
Mazzaro, being concerned with the approach of an autobiography, lets 
the apparent objective of a particular work obscure its intrinsic subjective 
import. Robert Say re's analysis of the form comfortably embraces the sub 
jective figure and the objective environment, and brings subtle historical 
judgment to bear. In earlier autobiography, Sayre observes, the self is "de 
fined ... by nature or religion or specific events or achievements; while 
later autobiography shows the self defined by "family, history, and civiliza 
tion" ("The Proper Study. . .Autobiographies in American Studies," 
American Quarterly, 29 (1977), p. 253). This is at once decisive and sugges 
tive criticism, setting a dependable frame and affording a necessary freedom 
for others in the field. An arresting sidelight of Sayre's position has to do 
with the extent to which its vocabulary reflects our own times, when au 
thorities as different as Skinner and Norman Brown and Peter Berger alike 
give society priority over the individual and power to determine his reality. 
Is the autobiographer "defined" by religion or by civilization? I would 
suggest that the autobiographer is rather defined by himself, in relation to re 
ligion or civilization, etc. 
Here again, Newman may help us to draw a distinction that seems vital 
to the genre of autobiography, which cannot exist if the self insists on a 
genuine isolation, and which yet does not subsist if the self succumbs to its 
history or environment or institutions. As Schiller observes in the 11th Let 
ter On the Aesthetic Education of Man, "We exist because we exist; we feel, 
think and will because there is something other besides ourselves." Cer 
tainly Newman seems the most bound to time and place (he is an En 
glishman in the mid-nineteenth century) and to institutions and specific 
events (he is a convert to and cleric in the Roman Catholic Church). This 
proves far from meaning that he immolates himself to Church or State. In 
stead he assumes them into himself, and they depend on him for justifica 
tion and 
representation. He writes as "a living man," whose nation and 
faith are secure, but whose life has been impugned. He writes about nation 
and faith, but distinctly for himself. The final image of his religious col 
leagues surrounding him is preeminently personal. The early pages on his 
disposition to religion are likewise personal. And everything in between 
springs from and returns to that personality. 
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The problem for autobiography is how far its matter can spring from the 
self, and not lose personal connection and value. What limits arise as re'gards 
the self and the other? I would begin by saying that the self is confronted or 
tested, instead of defined, by the other, and go on to make two observa 
tions: l)because Dr. Johnson looms so large and so obsessively in Boswell's 
eyes, Boswell is a biographer, not an autobiographer; and 2)though Rous 
seau talks intensely, even endlessly about others, he manages to make them 
somehow static, while he is dynamic, and the eye follows the moving ob 
ject. Of course, the other can be a historical event, a pressing question of 
politics or society or philosophy, and need not be a person. In whatever 
form it gets too weighty and swings toward the center, the limit for the 
autobiographer has been passed, and he is essayist or polemicist or what 
have-you. By and large we can tell whether the autobiographer contains the 
essayist, or vice versa. 
Such a determination results from analysis of style, just as it would in the 
case of fiction. We see dialogue and description and argument in a novel and 
know that these elements are in line and in proportion, so that we hold aside 
any thought of drama or travelogue or essay. But there is also in autobiog 
raphy a matter of intent. All writing may be called auto-indicative, down to 
a Linnaean classification system; some writing must be called auto 
expressive, such as a piece of libel; and then there is autobiographical writ 
ing, which may include a classification of one's possessions or a statement of 
one's aversions. But writing becomes autobiography when, to the data of 
one's actions and thoughts and relations and associations, in space and time, 
there is added a specific consciousness and conception of what it all means to 
the self and who the self is in relation to it all. 
At the same time, the use of the term "self is laden with problems and 
assumptions that we would do well to bring out of the hold and into the 
light. For if autobiography must peculiarly convey the intent of the writer, 
it must also tacitly satisfy the expectations of the reader, and those expecta 
tions center around the obscure idea of the self. It is time that we acknow 
ledged that the self is more inclusive, more complexly established, and 
more licentiously distributed than any autobiography could hope to en 
compass. Simply put, the self is more than it knows, and autobiograhy af 
fords not even this, the self as known, but only the self as chosen and 
shown. It is that form which proves that the "I" lives, and as it says it has. 
Much would be gained, no doubt, if we analyzed the term auto-bio-graphy 
not as life-writing-by-the-self, but as ego-life-writing. 
This is in keeping with the fact that autobiography gives articulation to a 
will to identity or subjective particularity. It is Henry Adams, the shy au 
tobiographer, who forthrightly declares that the form is not concerned with 
"a type but a will." In some quarters the form comes under suspicion the 
moment such a statement appears, on the ground that ego-biases will in 
vade the material and force it to serve private prejudices and needs, rather 
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than The Truth. In fact, autobiography is supposed to enunciate the private 
personality, and it seems odd to suppose that one is more disinterested 
about the other than about the self. Hegel makes a telUng comment in this 
regard, when he calls self-awareness "Das einheimliche Reich der Wah 
rheit." 
The availability, the decisive availability of ego-choice helps us to set two 
complementary limits for autobiography, which as a mere faithful record of 
actuality would fall into incoherence, and as a mere illustration of a principle 
would fall into fatalism. The faithful record amounts to a random bunch of 
beads, and brings to mind Kierkegaard's plangent question in EitherlOr: 
"... Can you think of anything more frightful than that it might end with 
your nature being resolved into a multipUcity, that you really might be 
come many, become, Uke those unhappy demoniacs, a legion and you thus 
would have lost the h?hest and inmost thing of all in a man, the unifying 
power of personality?" In dealing with the past, autobiography is not 
exhibiting any weakness for neurotic repetition in the Freudian vein. Au 
tobiography does not repeat actions and situations in the past, but rather 
uses them to ground the individual in the present against their possible 
domineering or lethal shocks. The act of autobiography thus resembles, if 
anything, a Kierkegaardian repetition, a selection and election of actions and 
situations in one's life to clarify and estab?sh one's self as a decisive subject/ 
agent. 
And yet it holds good that one cannot get away with making one's Ufe a 
mere iUustration of a principle, even if that principle is one's moral position. 
The mere iUustration amounts to a stranger's necklace, when it is the 
privilege and the obligation of the autobiographer to design his own gem. 
As Merleau-Ponty points out, though "it is the whole symbo?c conscious 
ness [of a culture] which . . . elaborates what the child Uves or does not Uve, 
suffers or does not suffer, feels or does not feel," and though the child per 
ceives 
"according to his culture's imagery," his "personal significance" 
arises when "he finally comes to the point of reversing the relationship and 
slipping into the meanings of his speech and behavior, converting even the 
most secret aspects of his experience into culture" ("The Philosopher and 
Sociology," in Essential Writings, ed. Alden L. Fisher, N.Y.: Harcourt, 
Brace and World, 1969, p.97). 
If we consider the circumstances under which autobiography first comes 
into its own in modern culture?the time limit or terminus a quo of the 
form?the freedom of the individual to establish his 
"personal significance" 
over against the formal prescriptions of the society seems paramount. Three 
developments, between the late seventeenth century and the mid-eighteenth 
century, lead directly toward autobiography. The first is the change from 
universal history to contemporary, concrete historiography, as exempUfied 
in the work of Clarendon and Burnet. The second is the ampUfication of 
biography to include ordinary men as subjects (Roger North went further 
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than Dr. Johnson and suggested that more good would come from the "his 
tory of private lives adapted to the perusal of common men" than from state 
history). The third is the emergence of the novel as a sustained, major form. 
The new historiography suggests the importance of current affairs divorced 
from divine ordination; the novel suggests the interest of images and pat 
terns of individual experience not sanctioned by political or social elevation; 
and the new biography suggests that actual individuals of no pubUc glamor 
could fit the bill for significance and value. The obvious next step was for 
the individual of no canonized status, about whom life stories by others 
might materialize, to take hold of his own story, or autobiography. The 
stimulus then was not only historical, in that the background of events vir 
tually demanded the form, but also psychological. To have a Horatio or a 
Boswell would be well, but to have the person who had always been there, 
feeling and thinking and doing everything, was the right thing to have. 
As far as the environment for the origin of autobiography goes, one 
further factor must be considered momentous. That is a revision of the role 
or standing of the individual in society. As late as Pope and Johnson, it was 
tacitly held that the individual would fulfill the expectations and realize the 
values of society, or he would be at fault. But with Rousseau, as it were 
abruptly, the postulate is raised that the society must fulfill the dreams and 
help to realize the potentialities of the individual or it is at fault. Rousseau 
signalized a kind of uncrystalUzation of norms, or dissolving of definitions, 
wherein it becomes possible and indeed urgent for the individual to see a 
peculiar shape to his life and to establish a guardedly general vaUdity for that 
shape. Of course Augustine and Bunyan appear to achieve autobiography 
within a strongly crystallized system, but they also exhibit the tendency of 
such a system to digest the individual or in corollary the tendency of such an 
individual to sacrifice the self-as-experienced to the self-as-interpreted and 
conformable in terms of 
something independent outside. In short, au 
tobiography may occur anywhere, but has sustained itself only where the 
socio-cultural environment tolerates a critical degree of self-definition and 
ego-construction. Augustine, who set out to write confessions, is really an 
apologist, while Newman, who sets himself up as apologist, is more truly 
an egotist. We may find it instructive to recall here Blake's opinion that 
"The Book written by Rousseau call'd his Confessions, is an apology & 
cloke for his sin & not a confession" {Jerusalem, III, "To the Deist"). 
The truth that autobiography espouses, on this reading, is only inciden 
tally the truth of exact occurrences and recoverable postures. This would 
amount to a truth about the self, without the self. A brief story may be of 
fered in illustration. My five-year-old niece is exceedingly shy, and very 
fussy about the people she will so much as say hello to. But she got along 
famously with my younger daughter, whose coat-tails my twelve-year-old 
son was prepared to ride into his little cousin's good graces. "Do you re 
member Laura?" he asked on a visit to the family. "Laura?" The question 
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was a bit disconcerting, but at least she had spoken. "Yes. Do you re 
member Laura?" "You mean the girl with the long hair?" "Yes." "The one 
that used to play with me?" "Yes?" "The one that used to bathe me?" 
"Yes." "And put me to bed at night?" "Yes. Do you remember her?" 
"No." The point is right up front: the details are there, but the person as 
such is denied. 
The truth of autobiography is most properly the truth of the ego's rela 
tionships and evaluations and constructions. The truth of history and biog 
raphy is that Gibbon and Yeats were eminent persons and consummate suc 
cesses, but the truth for them in autobiography is that they were haunted, 
constrained, unconsummated men. We should not oppose Dichtung, per 
sonal sentiments and values, to Wahrheit, objective matter; rather we 
should see them as aspects of one another. This sort of duplex condition 
may not be notable in itself, but it acquires some significance when we rec 
ognize that some sort of low-grade paradox surrounds autobiography: it is a 
genre without conventions; it demands a fusion of narrative and conceptual 
modes, the self as action and as thought; and it involves a singular statement 
of representative values, founded on the peculiarity of the first person singu 
lar pronoun, that it belongs no less to the auditor than to the speaker, and 
works best when an impulse of identification occurs. In this respect, au 
tobiography must observe the boundary that would take it over into inti 
mate aUegory?the self in autobiography must be first and foremost rep 
resentative of itself, to the other, and not representative of the other in the 
self. In this form the representative man must be Emersonian, rather than 
Johnsonian. 
The limits of autobiography operate in significant ways to concentrate its 
powers. Or perhaps it is truer to say that the Umits of the form effectively 
concentrate the powers of the figure in the form, the informing figure of the 
autobiography. That figure can be seen invariably in three conditions: as the 
chosen one and private hero; as a peculiar entity vis-?-vis others who, while 
necessary for confirmation, may also pose a threat of usurpation; and as re 
lated to the intractable order (and orders) of the world. These three condi 
tions interpenetrate one another, but it is not hard to see that the self as hero 
predominates in Rousseau, the self vis-?-vis the other in Yeats, and the self 
withstanding the discipUne of the world in Henry Adams. The arresting 
thing about such conclusions, which seem banal on the face of things, is that 
evidence for them is so various and pervasive. Rousseau is a hero in planting 
his willow tree and creating the makeshift aqueduct to keep it alive, a hero 
in breaking a record for degeneracy ("never did a precocious Caesar," as he 
comments, "so promptly become a Laridon"), a hero if gifts, having "di 
vine" arias in his head, a hero in suffering, in uniqueness. The term he uses 
to sum up one aspect of his behavior is "subUme heroism" (Cohen trans., p. 
46), and the effect of its obverse, namely his falling to depths of villainy (p. 
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47), is to set him apart for special honesty and is offset by his excellent mo 
tives: 
my innate goodwill towards my fellow men; my burning love for the 
great, the true, the beautiful, and the just; my horror of evil in every 
form, my inability to hate, to hurt, or even to wish to; that softening, 
that sharp and sweet emotion I feel at the sight of all that is virtuous, 
generous, and lovable. 
. . 
.(p.333). 
It is not a matter that heroism befell Rousseau everywhere, but rather that 
he solicited it everywhere. The autobiographer's sense of himself as hero, 
his ego-sense is the record of his intimate experience of the possibihty of 
annihilation. And Rousseau in particular, pressing his uniqueness and his 
taste for solitude, is expressing his almost unbearable sense of the presence 
of other people. He has an eristic reaction to the other, and in self 
proclaimed heroism and contrived solitude seeks necessary re?ef. 
The discipline that Henry Adams undergoes in the world is likewise ap 
parent in many guises. At one level it is his grandfather simply laying hands 
on him and haling him off to school. At another level it is Thurlow Weed's 
"irresistibly conquering confidence" (146) and at yet another it is the "mor 
tifying failure" of his "confirmed dislike, distrust, and detraction of Lord 
Palmerston," and his finding himself "ob?ged. . .to admit himself in error, 
and. . .to beg his pardon" (164). Much may be made of the presence of 
older men, authority figures, in all these cases. Boy and man, Adams is en 
countering something unyielding and undeniable outside. He comes under 
domination. This domination finally attains abstract and ubiquitous quality 
when it occurs as a symbol in the dynamo, which appears as impenetrable as 
indispensable with its "infinite costly energy." Here is a kind of god-as 
machine before which Adams finds himself 
"helpless." 
It is immediately obvious, and troublesome, that Rousseau more than 
holds his own vis-?-vis the 
other-as-personality, whereas Adams goes 
down to defeat at the hands of the other-as-the-order-of-the-world. Rous 
seau defines heroism for himself and proclaims himself its exemplar. With 
Adams, the hero posited for autobiography seems to have fallen upon evil 
days and suffered extinction. But Adams also sets the terms of value so as to 
put himself in a most favorable, a heroic light. In fact, even as he makes the 
first fuU announcement of the demise of any traditional heroism, he makes 
himself the first modern hero, helpless, bandied about by circumstances, 
but very knowing and capable of the most minute dissection of his case and 
of the most exquisite transplanting of his case into the body of his culture. 
Adams is the hero of hapless knowledge, par excellence. He is the quintes 
sence of "sensitive and timid" man. In the entire history of heroism, one 
may observe a continual diminuendo in social involvement, from Homer 
who rests this trait on prowess that the entire society recognizes and thrives 
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on, to Virgil, who features devotion that the entire society profits from, to 
Milton, who concentrates on a rectitude that must multiply itself among 
individuals for the society to get its full benefit, to Wordsworth or Byron 
who alike put the individual into an oblique and problematic relation to soc 
iety, proffering personality before service. Adams reduces the individual yet 
further; he treats the intellect as hero, and his intellect is detached, inert, 
stamped with the knowledge that personality, rectitude, devotion, and 
prowess are soap bubbles in the wind tunnel of time. 
It is not by accident that he comes as close as can bearably be done to 
writing an autobiography with no name. Adams exploits the third person 
reference to himself and the adoption of the nomenclature of his 
functions?"the private secretary" (p. 148) in one situation, "the mind" (p. 
498) in another?to bring home how far the old relations and definitions 
and assurances and presences have been reduced, and how far he has been 
brought into exiguousness. But that thin remnant is enough to offer as a 
pioneer, a unique figure in the ground of deprivation: "The private secre 
tary alone sought education." Or listen to Adams when he feels an original 
"sense of possible purpose working itself out in history"; some people 
would recaU Hegel or Augustine, but Adams declares: "Probably no one 
else on this earthly planet. . .could have come out on precisely such personal 
satisfaction. . ." (363). In the long run Adams carries himself, delicately but 
unmistakably, into universal proportions. He is projecting a formula that 
takes in "all history, terrestrial or cosmic, mechanical or intellectual." It all 
seems as remote as possible from individual experience, but there remains a 
virtual point at which Adams differs from Hegel and even Augustine. His 
projection avoids the discursive and the analytical, which would seem 
proper, and is kept within the domain of personality and emotion by the use 
of metaphor. 
For convenience [Adams writes, and the very word 'convenience' 
warns us of intimacy to come], the most familiar image should come 
first; and this is probably that of the comet, or meteoric streams, Uke 
the Leonids and Perseids; a complex of minute mechanical agencies, 
reacting with and without, and guided by the sum of forces attracting 
and deflecting it. Nothing forbids one to assume that the man 
meteorite might grow, as an acorn does, absorbing light, heat, 
electricity?or thought; for, in recent times, such transference of 
energy has become a familiar idea; but the simplest figure, at first, is 
that of a perfect comet?say that of 1843?which drops from space, in a 
straight line, at the regular acceleration of speed, directly into the sun, 
and after wheeling sharply about it, in heat that ought to dissipate any 
known substance, turns back unharmed, in defiance of law, by the path 
on which it came. The mind, by analogy, may figure as such a comet, 
the better because it also defies law. 
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Here is the nub of Adams' individuality and heroism. "The mind" not only 
works as his chosen instrument, it becomes his surrogate, the synecdoche 
for his self. And its veritably Byronic defiance (the comet is the equivalent 
of Byron's "tannen" in Childe Harold IV) represents Adams' withstanding 
as well as understanding the forces, from his grandfather to the dynamo, 
that could seem to dominate him. The play of withstanding-cum 
understanding makes him precisely a hero of intellect. His education, osten 
sibly in agnosticism and ineffectuality, proves to be an education in this 
brand of heroism. 
The metaphor of withstanding may have a general va?dity for autobiog 
raphy as such, and not just special moment for Henry Adams. Involving the 
possibility of annihilation for the man-meteorite (the ego is either mechani 
cal, i.e. not an ego, or it is nothing), this metaphor takes us back to the 
problem of death and the form of autobiography. Adams differs from most 
autobiographers in that he comes right out with his desire to live spiritually 
beyond his life, and to talk, or at least see, from beyond the grave. He 
adopts the idiom of resurrection ("the new man") and, though he says "Na 
ture has educated herself to a singular sympathy for death," he envisions 
himself as a revenant, as a kind of cross between self-indulgence and in 
domitability, in a later world in which he can live with more than a shud 
der. The title of the concluding section, "Nunc Age," implies a consumma 
tion of the heroism of intellect, for the thing Adams is now doing amounts to 
a rank act of imagination, of imposing the mind on all-insistent matter; and 
this heroism comes through undoing, or better outdoing death. Autobiog 
raphy becomes for Adams the apotropaic of death. 
In this, as already suggested, Adams is not alone. Autobiographers seem 
to reach for certain apocalyptic possibilities, and to move toward breaking 
the limits of personal time, whether manifested in death or in other forms of 
absolute grounding of the ego. Everyone will readily recall the way Gibbon 
imagines that "this day may possibly be [his] last," then statistically gives 
himself another "fifteen years," then in a crucial aside shows his mind filled 
with versions of eschatology: "parents. 
. 
.commence a new Ufe in their chil 
dren;. . . enthusiasts. . . sing Hallelujahs above the clouds; and [vain] au 
thors. . 
.presume the immortality of their name and writings." In Uke man 
ner Rousseau, at the very end of his Confessions, seems concerned with the 
problem of how to defend himself after death, in a kind of proleptic 
paranoia. In actuality he curses those who refuse "to investigate and inquire 
into" any version of his life contrary to his own <(during [his] lifetime," but in 
essence his curse ("anything contrary. . .is a lie and an imposture," and 
anyone believing it "is no lover of justice or of truth") rings through the 
ages. His "lifetime" becomes perpetual, to the extent that his fleshly will to 
protect his name by "stifling" detractors is transferred onto the eschatology 
of language. 
It will hardly be necessary here to do more than cite Thoreau's great 
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Sabaoth prophecy: "The sun is but a morning star"; or again DeQuincey's 
far more complex declaration, in his capacity as a "transcendental philoso 
pher," of hatred and contempt for his body, and of indifference to the eight 
and a half years still available to him (versus Gibbon's fifteen), and of eager 
ness for a 
"posthumous revenge" that is not only against his own body but 
also, as the context makes clear, against the body of science and received 
opinion. But then DeQuincey had already been living a posthumous exis 
tence, as one returned from the apocalyptic heaven and hell of opium. 
The ultimate paradox of autobiography, we may now recognize, is that 
the more it is beset with Umits, the more it enables its subject to survive and 
define (i.e., limn and delimit) himself. No other literary form known to me 
has such limits or such tight-rope precariousness as form; no other form has 
such personal freedom. Thus, if it is poignant to think of Petrarch asking, 
"do you remember Laura?" it is more so to reaUze that under that question 
another is lurking (as it was lurking for my twelve-year-old son in the face 
of a reticent environment); and that question is, "Do you remember me?" 
Autobiography, depicting ego-Ufe over against death, and attaining for that 
ego the only presentation it can recognize as anything but a Ue and impos 
ture worthy to be stifled (to adopt Rousseau's words), changes that inter 
rogative to an imperative. It says, remember me, and as I am to myself: 
singular, for aU that others cogently exist or the insistent world encompas 
ses me, and singularly immortal. 
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